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This paper discusses the welfare economic foundations of cost-effectiveness (CE) analysis. 
Although it is not a comprehensive review of the techniques of CE analysis, the paper addresses
application as well as theory because the welfare economic properties of decisions based on CE
analysis necessarily depend upon the way that the method is applied.  In fact, application has
stimulated much of the interest in the theoretical foundations of CE analysis.  As government
officials, private insurers, health care providers, and others have begun to use CE analysis to
inform decisions about the adoption and allocation of specific health interventions, they have
revealed the need to improve and standardize its methods.
There is no doubt that CE analysis is potentially useful: by quantifying the tradeoffs
between resources consumed and health outcomes achieved with the use of specific interventions,
the technique can help physicians, health plans, insurers, government agencies, and individuals to
prioritize services and to allocate health care resources.  CE analysis aids such decisions by
structuring comparisons among alternative interventions. Meaningful comparisons, in turn, require
standardization.  Without standardization, there can be no assurance that the results of a CE
analysis of one set of interventions will be comparable to the results of a study of a different set of
interventions.  Thus the method must be valid, and it must be applied consistently.  Perhaps the
most important contribution of an examination of welfare economic foundations is that it can help
ensure that any set of standards adopted for CE analysis will be logically consistent, valid, and
credible. 
Several efforts around the world have sought to move the field of CE analysis forward by
strengthening the methodology and promoting standardization.  Among these are various
governmental guidelines (such as Australian pharmacoeconomic guidelines and those of Ontario),
the European Community Concerted Action on the Harmonisation of the Methodology for
Economic Evaluation of Health Technology (HARMET), and the Panel on Cost-Effectiveness in
Health and Medicine.  The last group, sponsored by the U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services, issued a comprehensive report in 1996 detailing recommendations for the application of
CE analysis (Gold, et al. (1996)).  The report distinguished between recommendations that had a
strong theoretical justification and those that had no firm theoretical grounding, but were made to4
ensure uniformity, usually based in part upon ease of implementation and other practical considerations.
The advantages of methodological standardization in CE analysis are greatest when the
standards are selected with both rigor and transparency.  To the extent that standards are chosen
arbitrarily, they merely ensure that diverse studies will use consistent — but potentially invalid and
misleading — methods.  To develop recommendations that could be justified from first principles,
the Panel on Cost-Effectiveness in Health and Medicine drew upon recent work on the welfare
economic foundations of CE analysis.  Since CE analysis evolved largely outside the framework of
welfare economics, an exploration of the welfare economic foundations neither recapitulates nor
parallels the history of the development of the approach.  Yet by relating CE analysis to theoretical
foundations it is possible to illuminate the consequences of alternative methodological practices. 
For example, there has been a longstanding controversy about future costs of health care: Should
costs that result solely from living longer, but otherwise are not directly influenced by an
intervention, be attributed to that intervention?  Some investigators, such as Weinstein and Stason
(1977), have recommended always including such “unrelated” future costs of care while others,
such as Russell (1986), have urged the opposite.  Presumably one of these practices is incorrect,
and the persistence of two distinct practices renders the results of different studies non-
comparable.  Other methodological controversies are no easier to resolve, such as whether to
incorporate time costs as dollar costs (hence part of the numerator of the CE ratio), or as a
reduction in the health outcome like years of life (in the denominator).  In cases such as these,
which are discussed below, methodological standardization offers the prospect of replacing a set of
inconsistent practices with a single correct method.
An exploration of the welfare theoretic foundations for CE analysis can provide a rationale
for selecting specific standards while deepening our understanding of the implications of
alternative methodological approaches.  However, few attempts to explore the theoretical
foundations of CE analysis have been published.  Both proponents and critics of CE analysis have
been skeptical of the value of some of the traditional standards of welfare economics, at least when
applied to health care.  To many economists, the forms of market failure common in health care
supply much of the rationale for applying a tool like CE analysis or CB analysis.  But others are
skeptical of the premises and conclusions of welfare economics more generally, and see CE
analysis as a method to make policy decisions when market outcomes are unacceptable. 5
Some proponents of CE analysis have adopted an “extra-welfarist” perspective, arguing
that there are fundamental justifications for pursuing CE analysis without reference to welfare
economics (see Hurley (1999)).  The assumptions and, some would argue, the values underlying
this perspective can be more general than under the typical welfare economic perspective. 
Proponents of the extra-welfarist perspective claim that improvement of health is a primary goal of
social policy, a goal whose value is self-evident and does not depend upon the maximization of
individual utility functions.  They do not necessarily accept the arguments of social welfare (e.g.,
the prominence of individual consumption of goods and services) that are typical in formulations
proposed by economists, nor do they accept the typical assumptions made.  For extra-welfarists,
CE analysis offers a way for a social decision maker to learn how to obtain the greatest health
effect from a specified expenditure, or to find the lowest-cost approach to achieve a given health
effect. It is unnecessary to ask whether an allocation based on CE analysis leads to a potential
Pareto improvement or a Pareto-optimal distribution.
Although this perspective makes it possible to analyze the optimal allocation of health
resources without accepting the full range of welfare economic assumptions, it has other
limitations.  By eschewing any claim to justification on the basis of a more fundamental
framework, the extra-welfarist perspective requires acceptance of the principle that maximizing
quality-adjusted life years or another specific health outcome measure should be the goal of health
care provision.  Acceptance of a specific measure is much more problematic than accepting the
general concept that improvement in health is a social good.  Results from a study using QALYs as
the health measure may differ from those that measure health in terms of longevity.  Usually, the
validity of the health outcome measure must be assumed rather than tested.  The extra-welfarist
approach can determine the best measure of health outcomes by appeal to political processes.  But
to the extent that it rejects market and personal valuations of health improvements, the extra-
welfarist approach cannot appeal to a more fundamental set of principles to resolve whether one
measure of health outcomes is more valid than another.  Nor is it easy to use this approach to
evaluate tradeoffs between health and other social goods, such as education, nutrition, or other
aspects of well-being.  Finally, it provides no direct mechanism for resolving certain economic
issues — such as what constitutes a cost, and how cost should be measured.
In contrast to the extra-welfarist perspective, this paper uses a welfare economic framework
to address questions of standardization.  The fundamental question underlying our approach is6
simple: does decision making based on CE analysis, carried out a specific way, lead to a distribution
of resources that has desirable social welfare properties?  In other words, does a ranking of
alternative uses of health resources based on CE analysis lead to an allocation that improves
welfare?  The answer depends on the way that CE analysis is performed, the way the results are
used, and the definition of social welfare improvement.
To economists familiar with cost-benefit (CB) analysis, these questions imply another: Why
perform CE analysis, rather than CB analysis, whose economic foundations and social welfare
implications are well known?  In some circumstances they appear to give nearly equivalent results
(Phelps and Mushlin (1991)).  However, in principle, CB analysis is more general than CE analysis
(Kenkel (1997)).  Furthermore, CE and CB analysis grew from different historical traditions and
have been adopted for different reasons.  CB analysis requires placing dollar valuations on the
outcomes of any program or intervention.  In the context of health and medical care, making that
valuation can be equivalent to placing a dollar value on a human life (or, more precisely, on changes
in the probability distribution of the length or quality of human life).  To many in the worlds of
medicine and of public health, any attempt to place a value on a human life — even if it is usually a
valuation of a small change in the probability of death or a change in the distribution of expected
mortality, rather than an attempt to put a price on an identified individual’s life (Schelling (1968))
— is anathema.  Thus most “economic” evaluations in health care have applied CE analysis, which
limits the analyst’s responsibility to providing information about the efficiency with which
alternative strategies achieve health effects.  The often implicit task of placing monetary valuations
on health outcomes falls upon decisionmakers and others who read the analyses.
The fundamental differences between the techniques may also reflect the contexts in which
they developed.  CB analysis was developed primarily to assist in making decisions about the
provision of public goods.  Although CE analysis has also been used to evaluate public health
measures that are public goods or create externalities (e.g., vaccination programs), it is more often
used for the evaluation of private goods and services.  The reason to apply formal analysis in this
context is that information in health care is imperfect and often asymmetric.  Asymmetry is common
because the producers of health care, consumers, and payers possess different amounts of
information about the benefits, risks, costs, and other characteristics of health services.  Although
limited and asymmetric information is an issue in some contexts in which CB analysis has been
applied, nonexcludability and nonrivalry in consumption are the forms of market failure chiefly7
responsible for the popularity of CB analysis.  CE analysis, in contrast, assists patients and their
agents in making decisions about health care, which is generally a private good (with some notable
exceptions, such as infectious disease control).  Although the primary function of insurance is risk-
spreading, health insurers reimburse for services used rather than making lump sum payments. 
Consequently, a health insurer should also assure that optimality is achieved in health care
consumption by designing coverage and reimbursement so that the marginal utilities of health care
dollars are equated across patients and interventions. 
Information provided by CE analysis is important in two ways: First, health care is valued
insofar as it improves health and well-being, not for intrinsic characteristics of the health services. 
The relationship between the use of a medical intervention and improved health outcomes may not
be known to the individual patient or physician.  CE analysis can reveal how much value the patient
will obtain for a given expenditure on a health intervention.  Second, as Pauly (1968) has noted,
nearly all forms of health insurance are subject to moral hazard.  Once an enrolled individual has a
disease or other health condition, he or she would prefer to consume it to the point at which the
marginal benefit equals the marginal cost to his or her patient.  Because insurance lowers the
patient’s share to a small fraction of the full marginal cost (the fraction usually determined by a
fixed usage fee, percentage copayment, or deductible), insurance ordinarily results in
overconsumption.   Ex ante, an individual would prefer actuarially fair insurance which guaranteed
that care would be provided to the point at which marginal cost (insurance payment and copayment
combined) equalled marginal benefit over insurance that was subject to moral hazard.  Use of CE
analysis to allocate care (usually based on coverage decisions) might help limit moral hazard by
overcoming informational limitations.
In theory, the use of CE analysis to address moral hazard is straightforward.  Consider a
world of (near) perfect information.  That is, effectiveness and costs of treatment are known, but
information is not sufficiently inexpensive to enable insurers to monitor and overcome moral
hazard.  What would the ideal health insurance plan attempt to do?   Risk-averse individuals desire
insurance for the usual reasons.  They might also want the insurer to act as their agent in deciding
how much and what kinds of health care each should receive (or equivalently, the enrollees would
commit to accept levels and types of care that met a net benefit criterion as long as the premiums
were actuarially fair).  Assume further that every potential subscriber to the insurance plan has the
same ex ante probability of experiencing each possible stream of health outcomes, so that the8
prospects of each are equal, as behind the Rawlsian veil of ignorance (Rawls (1971)).  Under these
circumstances, if the insurer could act as a perfect agent for the consumer, it would attempt to set
the marginal benefits equal to the marginal costs of each intervention, but the marginal cost would
be at the point of purchase of the intervention.  That is, unless the insurer were a monopsonist, the
cost would be the price paid (which in turn would be the sum of the insurer’s payment and the
copayment).  This perspective adds insurer costs to the patient perspective that only includes out-of-
pocket costs.
The same logic applies to a provider that acts as an insurer, such as a health maintenance
organization.  However, for services that the provider produces itself, the relevant price is the
marginal cost defined over the suitable time horizon.  A government program that intended to
maximize the welfare of the citizens it serves would use a CE criterion on similar grounds.  In each
case, it would be optimal to equate the CE ratios of interventions used at the margin, using marginal
costs that the program bears — that is, the prices that it actually pays.
To the extent that consensus about specific social welfare criteria is lacking, not everyone
will be persuaded by an appeal to welfare economic foundations. Some writers have criticized the
utilitarian viewpoint that they believe to be embedded in this approach.  The justification for CE
analysis on this basis is indeed rooted in the compensation principle (or Kaldor-Hicks criterion) of
CB analysis (Hicks (1939), Kaldor (1939)).  This principle states that we should undertake a project
if and only if its net benefits are positive, since then those who gain from such a project gain by
enough to compensate those who lose.  If the losers are compensated, nobody is made worse off by
the project, and someone is made better off.  Thus the term potential Pareto improvement — the
project could result in an actual Pareto improvement if the winners compensated the losers.  Since a
precisely compensating reallocation is unlikely to occur, this criterion is less compelling than Pareto
improvement, since a project that produces positive net benefit would make people who shared the
costs but not the benefits worse off.
The paper is organized as follows.  The first section briefly describes the basics of CE
analysis and how it can be applied to aid decisions about the allocation of health resources.  The
paper then turns to the potential welfare economic foundations of CE analysis, drawing heavily on
my work with Charles Phelps.  The paper then addresses specific issues in carrying out CE analysis,
such as which costs to include, whose perspective matters in the analysis, and how health outcomes
are measured.  It demonstrates how a welfare economic foundation can help resolve ambiguities and9
uncertainties about the application of CE analysis.  The paper also discusses the limitations of such
an approach, which indeed reflect limitations of CE analysis as an analytic framework.  Finally, it
addresses unresolved issues such as the difficulties in using the results of CE analysis to make
health policy at the societal or group level.
2.  Cost-Effectiveness Analysis for Decision Making
How useful and valid are the results of CE analysis if its purpose is to improve the well-
being of a population by guiding the allocation of  health care resources?  Making this judgment
requires choosing a benchmark for well-being and an explicit statement about how CE analysis can
be used to achieve the welfare objectives.  Major published recommendations for the use of CE
analysis in guiding decisions state that it must be weighed with a variety of political, distributional
and practical considerations.  The information that CE analysis contributes is summarized by the CE
ratio. The CE ratio is a cost per unit health effect achieved by using a particular health intervention.
The CE ratio demonstrates which uses of health resources will provide health most efficiently; by
first using interventions that have the lowest CE ratio, i.e., that produce the greatest effect from a
specific expenditure, it is possible to obtain the greatest overall health effect from a limited budget
for health care.  Recent work on welfare foundations of CE analysis has used standard neoclassical
welfare economic formulations to examine whether implementation of CE analysis in this way (i.e.,
using different interventions to the point that their incremental CE ratios are equal at the margin)
leads to the same allocations as the ones that result from individual utility maximization subject to
income constraints.
To explore these issues further requires knowing precisely what the CE ratio represents and
how it is calculated.  As one might expect, the closer the connection between the health outcome
and individual welfare, the more plausible the claim that allocations based on CE criteria maximize
welfare.
Several authoritative textbooks and reviews have described the general approach for
performing a CE analysis; see for example, Drummond, et al. (1997), Gold, et al. (1996), Weinstein
and Stason (1977).  I briefly summarize the approach here.
First, the intervention to be studied, along with alternative interventions to which it is being
compared, must be defined.  One of the alternatives might be “doing nothing,” or applying no
specific intervention.  This has been the principal alternative considered in many CE analyses.  Yet a10
CE analysis based on a comparison with this alternative is not always informative, since the
comparison should be between relevant choices, such as two treatments or diagnostic approaches
that clinicians or policymakers would consider to be the most promising.  Little can be learned from
a CE analysis that compares an intervention with placebo when placebo is not considered a
reasonable option.  The CE ratio for a comparison with placebo can be favorable even when the
intervention in question is in every respect inferior to one or more commonly used alternatives. 
Several medications, for example, are both effective and cost-effective when used to treat adults
with moderately elevated blood pressure.  The relevant question for a new blood pressure
medication is how it compares to another promising  medication, or to others that are well-
established, rather than how it compares to the abandoned approach of forgoing treatment.
After we choose the intervention and alternative to be studied, we must assemble several
elements of the CE analysis to calculate the incremental (or marginal) CE ratio.  Throughout this
paper, the term CE ratio refers to the incremental CE ratio, unless otherwise specified.  The term
incremental is used rather than marginal to avoid confusion with the term marginal cost, which is
usually the preferred measure of opportunity cost in CE analysis.  Incremental refers to differences
between two interventions; since the comparison does not always involve an infinitesimal change in
costs and effectiveness, the term “marginal” can be misleading.  
Let the subscripts 1 and 0 denote the intervention under study and the alternative to which it
is compared, respectively.  If  C1 and C0 are the net present values of costs that result when the
intervention and alternatives are used, and E1 and E0 their respective health outcomes, the
incremental CE ratio is simply
.( 1 ) CE CC




This ratio, which is a cost per unit incremental health effect, is often used as a measure of value. 
The CE ratio of the intervention under study is compared to the CE ratios of other commonly used
forms of medical care; if it is relatively low, the intervention under study is considered to be a good
value.  Note that the intervention and alternative can be two different intensities of the same
treatment (e.g., dosage of a drug), and that the CE ratio can be defined as an infinitesimal charge. 
The continuously valued approach to the CE ratio underlies the analysis of Section 3.11
The elements of the numerator of the CE ratio, or the incremental cost of the intervention,
are discussed below.  There is consensus that C1 and C0 should represent net present values, but the
specific content of these numbers is controversial.  Much of the literature has used formulations
similar to that of Weinstein and Stason, who stated that net health care costs consist of “all direct
medical and health care costs [including] costs of hospitalization, physician time, medications,
laboratory services, counseling, and other ancillary services.”  In addition, the costs include those
“associated with the adverse side effects of treatment,” the (negative) costs from “savings in health
care, rehabilitation and custodial costs due to the prevention or alleviation of disease,” and “the
costs of treating diseases that would not have occurred if the patient had not lived longer as a result
of the original treatment” (Weinstein and Stason (1977), p. 718).  Many studies have attempted to
measure costs by including these categories.  Some experts exclude those that arise solely from
living longer, as previously noted. Others have included additional costs, such as “indirect” or
“productivity” costs (i.e., time costs of treatment and/or disease, lost wages, and so on) and
consumption expenditures.  The Panel on Cost-Effectiveness in Health and Medicine recommended
against including as costs the monetary value imputed for lost life years (i.e., lost earnings) and
withheld endorsement of including future consumption expenditures, yet many CE studies have
incorporated the imputed value of lost years of life in the cost measures.
The denominator of the CE ratio is calculated in an analogous manner; it represents the
incremental health effects of using the intervention.  Typical measures of health outcomes are either
years of life saved or quality-adjusted life years (QALYs) saved.  QALYs were introduced into the
literature in the mid-1970s as a way to incorporate the benefits of treatment more fully than could be
accommodated with earlier outcome measures.  They are intended to serve as a comprehensive
measure of health, or health-related well-being.   In many respects QALYs are analogous to life
expectancy, but give credit to interventions that improve quality of life even when they do not affect
survival.
Each year that an individual lives longer contributes an additional year to the life expectancy
calculation.  The amount that each additional year of life adds to QALYs, in contrast, is a preference
weight or utility that takes a value between 0 and 1, varying with health status during the
incremental year. Life years marred by functional limitations, pain, and other burdens associated
with illness receive less weight than years in good health.  Years when health is so bad that it is
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considered the worst possible health state.  A preference weight of 1 corresponds to best health
imaginable.  Interventions can raise QALYs by lengthening life or improving its quality as reflected
in the preference weight. Similarly, an intervention that lengthens life produces more QALYs if it
maintains or improves quality of life than if it adds years of life that are impaired by significant
morbidity.  Both life expectancy and QALYs can be discounted; that is, less weight is given to years
of life added in the more distant future.
QALY measurement is most easily understood by extending the measurement of life
expectancy.  Life expectancy is the sum of the probabilities that an individual will be alive at each
age (denoted by i) in the future, up to the maximal life span, or 
(2)




where Fi is the probability that the person who is now at the “current age” will still be alive at age i;
this discrete representation is most convenient for working with data such as life tables, but
continuous time representations of life expectancy are also used.
Calculation of QALYs requires the information used to calculate life expectancy and the
preference weights.  Denote the preference weight for the health characterizing age i by qi.   Each
such term is the expected value of quality adjustments for all possible states of health at age i.  To
illustrate the calculation, imagine that individuals alive at age 60 could be in one of only two
possible states of health: perfect health, (qh = 1), occurring with probability 0.5, or suffering from
heart disease (qd = .8), also occurring with probability 0.5.  Then q60, the expected value of the
preference weight corresponding to being alive at age 60, is (0.5 x 1) + (0.5 x 0.8) = 0.9.  After
estimating the value of qi for each age i, it is possible to calculate the expected number of QALYs,
in the form of present value, according to the formula
where δ  is a time discount factor whose value is between 0 and 1.  As in the formula for life
expectancy, Fi is the probability that the person is still alive at age i.  If δ=1, two years of life in
which qi = 0.33 contribute the same number of QALYs as one year in which qi = 0.66.  If there is no13
time discounting (δ = 1) and if each year of life has perfect health, or quality adjustment is ignored
(qi = 1 for every value of i), then this formula simplifies to the formula for life expectancy.
The mechanical aspects of calculating QALYs are not difficult, but the measurement of the
preference weights and the probabilities of alternative states of health is anything but
straightforward.  The specifics of QALY calculation necessarily account for much of the effort of
CE analysis, since the outcome measure is critical to the interpretation of the results.  As section 3
discusses, the outcome measure determines whether the application of CE analysis has desirable
welfare-theoretic properties.
Time horizon
An intervention can alter both costs and health effects long after it is administered.  For
example, a mammogram uses resources at the time the test is conducted.  But if it reveals an
abnormality that leads to breast biopsy, mastectomy, and the prevention of morbidity and mortality
from breast cancer, it alters the length of life, future morbidity, and future costs of health care. 
These long-term repercussions are relevant to any evaluation of screening with mammography, so
the standard recommendation is that all future costs and health effects should be calculated or
estimated in a CE analysis.  Measuring these costs and health effects directly — without use of a
model that extrapolates these numbers — would require observing until death a large number of
women who underwent mammography, along with a number of women who did not have the test. 
For many treatments and diagnostic or screening strategies, such an approach would require decades
of study, yet few randomized clinical trials last for more than five years.  Strong beliefs in the
credibility of direct clinical trial data, and skepticism about model-based extrapolations beyond the
period of the trial, have led some investigators to calculate costs and outcomes for the period of the
trial only.  Thus, rather than estimate life expectancy or quality-adjusted life years, they calculate
survival within the five years of a trial.  Similarly, rather than estimate net present value of lifetime
health care costs, they measure discounted costs during the period of the trial.  Usually, when
researchers adopt this approach, they do so in the belief that they have avoided making dubious
assumptions needed  to extrapolate events and costs that occur beyond the period for which they
have valid and reliable data.
This practice is not endorsed by experts on CE analysis.  There is no natural interpretation
for life-years gained during a finite period of time, and the CE ratios that result from using different14
time horizons, such as one year and five years, cannot be compared in any meaningful way.  In fact,
the resulting CE ratios can be understood best by interpreting them as special cases of standard CE
ratios.  In calculating a standard CE ratio, the time horizon is at least equal to the full span of life. 
The 5-year CE ratio is the same as a standard CE ratio calculated with an assumption that all
individuals die at the end of five years.  Thus, in the attempt to avoid the assumptions required for
modeling long time horizons, researchers who truncate their analyses have made, perhaps
unwittingly, the implausible alternative assumption that study subjects experience neither the costs
nor the benefits of living beyond the period of study.
Although it seems intuitive that calculating the CE ratio based on a truncated time period
should result in bias, it may not be possible to determine the sign of the bias a priori.   The bias can
only be calculated by making specific assumptions about the costs and health effects that occur after
the period of observation.  For example, suppose that the intervention in question lowers mortality
rates during five years of observation.  For individuals surviving the five years, subsequent survival
experience and costs are the same for those treated with placebo as for those who received the
intervention.  Under these assumptions, both the gain in life-years and the increase in costs are
greater for the intervention group than would be estimated on the basis of the truncated period of
observation.  The overall bias in the CE ratio depends upon the relative magnitudes of these omitted
costs and health effects. 
Average CE ratio
Some CE analyses report an average CE ratio, which is simply the ratio of C1 to E1.   For
comparisons among multiple alternatives, a similar practice is common: each intervention is
compared to a single alternative.  Both approaches are convenient because either they do not require
a comparison treatment, or all treatments are compared to a single alternative, rather than to
multiple alternatives.  Both approaches, however, are misleading.  The average CE ratio is
equivalent to a standard (incremental) CE ratio in which the alternative is costless and results in
immediate death.  If such an alternative exists, it is rare for any but the most rapidly and uniformly
fatal health conditions.  The average CE ratio can deviate greatly from the incremental CE ratio
when the intervention under study is a preventive service, which typically would be administered to
a relatively healthy population.  The members of such a population would be expected to have many
years of good health and to generate substantial costs over their remaining lifetimes. 15
The average CE ratio will not, in general, lead to appropriate rankings of alternative health
expenditures (see, for example, Karlsson and Johannesson (1996)), although occasionally it is
possible to draw limited inferences about the value of the incremental CE ratio from the average CE
ratio.  The average CE ratio does not reliably indicate the way to achieve the greatest health benefit
from a given expenditure.  For example, an intervention that produces more favorable outcomes
than one that has a lower average CE ratio could have an acceptable incremental CE ratio but might
not be selected on the basis of the average CE ratio; alternatively, the average CE ratio might be
considered “acceptable” when the incremental CE ratio was very high.
Comparison of multiple interventions to a single alternative is misleading for nearly the
same reason, except that the “baseline” costs and outcomes are not zero, but instead are the costs
and outcomes corresponding to the single comparator.  It is easiest to understand why this is
misleading by comparing it to the incremental approach.
Incremental CE ratio for multiple alternatives 
It is possible to calculate a separate incremental CE ratio for every pair of alternative
interventions.  When many interventions are considered, the number of such pairs becomes large. 
However, because most of the incremental CE ratios are irrelevant, the analyst need not calculate all
of them.  Instead, to determine the incremental CE of a series of different combinations of
technologies, the analyst should first rank each alternative by the health effect achieved — e.g., the
number of QALYs (or life-years) it produces.  Then the analyst should determine whether any
interventions are strictly dominated (more expensive and less effective than at least one alternative
intervention); if any are, they should be eliminated from further consideration.  After eliminating all
such alternatives, one should calculate the incremental CE ratios between each intervention and the
next most expensive alternative.  Subsequently, interventions that display extended dominance
should also be eliminated, and the incremental CE ratios of all remaining alternatives calculated.  
Extended dominance is defined below.16
Figure 1. Costs and QALYs with alternative test strategies for coronary artery 
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Figure 1, from Garber and Solomon (1999), illustrates how incremental CE analysis can be
applied when multiple alternatives are considered.  It shows the costs and health effects of adopting
each of several strategies for diagnosing coronary artery disease in 55 year-old women. The first five
strategies are exercise treadmill testing (ETT); stress echocardiography (ECHO); planar thallium
radionuclide imaging (Thallium); single photon emission computed tomography (SPECT); and
positron emission tomography (PET).  Each of these strategies starts with a noninvasive test for
coronary disease.  The “gold standard” test for coronary artery disease is cardiac catheterization with
coronary angiography; the screening strategies that start with a noninvasive test proceed to
catheterization if the test is abnormal.  The final strategy shown in the figure (angiography) consists
of initial testing with the gold standard test, so that the first test is considered definitive but riskier17
and more expensive than the other tests.
The costs and outcomes of each of the diagnostic strategies are calculated by modeling the
consequences of alternative medical interventions that are pursued on the basis of the test results. 
For example, if a diagnostic test is positive and leads to the discovery of a severe form of coronary
artery disease, it leads to surgical treatment, which in turn may prolong life substantially. A false
positive test result has minimal adverse health effects, but leads to substantial expenditures for
further testing that is, in retrospect, unnecessary.   Figure 1 is a compact representation of results
from extensive modeling of alternative strategies that have large but often indirect and complex
effects on both costs and health outcomes.
Because each point on the figure represents the overall costs and outcomes in QALYs that
result from the use of each test, the incremental CE ratio between any pair of tests is the inverse of
the slope of the line drawn between their corresponding points.  A point that is above and to the left
of another strictly dominates the alternative, i.e., has better outcomes and lower costs.  In Figure 1,
angiography eliminates PET scanning by strict dominance.  Thallium is also eliminated by strict
dominance because it produces slightly fewer QALYs than ECHO at greater cost.  The incremental
CE ratios are calculated for the remaining alternatives.  18
Figure 2.  Costs and QALYs with alternative test strategies for coronary 
artery disease in men, 45 years of age.  Reproduced with permission from 
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Figure 2 (also from Garber and Solomon), which shows similar results for 45 year-old men,
illustrates extended dominance.  For these subjects, unlike 55 year-old women, thallium is not
eliminated by strict dominance, since no alternative intervention is both less expensive and more
effective in these men.  Extended dominance is a somewhat more subtle concept than strict
dominance; it occurs whenever a linear combination of two alternatives strictly dominates a third
(Keeney and Raiffa (1993), Johannesson and Weinstein (1993),  Karlsson and Johannesson (1996)). 
Equivalently, the phenomenon occurs when any interventions have  “higher incremental C/E ratios
than a more effective option” (Siegel, et al. (1996)).  Although no alternative is both less expensive
and more effective than thallium, it is strictly dominated by at least one point on a line drawn
between ECHO and SPECT, so it is eliminated by extended dominance.
Strict dominance and extended dominance are particularly important phenomena because
they can identify interventions that should be eliminated from consideration, without making any
judgment about what a unit health effect is worth.  Strict dominance cannot always be detected19
without formal analysis, and extended dominance is even harder to discover, unless the analysis
includes a systematic approach to incremental CE ratios.
A rational decision maker will never choose an option that can be eliminated under extended
dominance, because a more expensive alternative would result in a lower or equivalent CE ratio.
Suppose that there are three alternatives under consideration: A, B, and C.  Both the costs and the
outcomes associated with intervention C are greater than those of intervention B, which in turn are
greater than those of intervention A.  Thus none of the interventions strictly dominates any other. 
The (incremental) CE ratio of intervention B compared to A is $70,000/QALY, and the CE ratio of
C compared to B is $10,000/QALY.  If a decision maker would choose B over A, it implies that a
gain of a QALY is worth at least $70,000 to him or her.  If that is the case, then it must be true that
it is worth an additional $10,000 to gain another QALY, so that C would be chosen over B.  Thus
alternative B is eliminated from consideration by extended dominance.
The CE ratios that result from comparing several interventions to a single alternative, rather
than proceeding in this stepwise fashion, can be very different. Usually it is impossible to detect the
presence of either strict or extended dominance from such an approach.  In fact, the CE ratio
produced this way may appear to be “reasonable” even though the intervention under consideration
is strictly dominated by another!  Suppose that there is an intervention A that generates lower costs
than interventions B and C, as in Figure 3.  We are interested in choosing among the three.  If we
calculate cost-effectiveness ratios of B compared to A and C compared to A, it is difficult to
determine whether we should choose C over B.  If the CE ratio of C compared to A is lower than the
ratio of B compared to A, C could eliminate B by extended or strict dominance (points B
1 and B
2 in
Figure 3, respectively) or, alternatively, B could have an “acceptable” CE ratio compared to B (point
B
3).  The only firm conclusion that can be drawn, without further information, is that B does not
eliminate C by strict dominance.20
Figure 3. The consequences of comparing two interventions to a third.  Intervention A is
the lowest cost alternative; the incremental CE ratio of C compared to A is lower than the
incremental CE ratio of B compared to A.  Interventions B
1, B
2, and B
3 all have the same
CE ratio compared to A.  C eliminates B
1 by extended dominance and B
2 by strict
dominance, while the CE ratio of B
3 compared to C could be “acceptable” (i.e., lower than
a CE cutoff).  Without further information, it is not possible to determine from the CE
ratios of C compared to A and B compared to A which of these three conditions applies.
Calculation of the incremental CE ratio, then, consists of estimating the QALYs and the present
value of costs under the intervention and under its alternatives.  The use of the average CE ratio or
comparison of several interventions with a single alternative is misleading.21
Sensitivity analysis
Uncertainty characterizes several components of nearly every CE analysis.  Estimates of
health effects, whether measured in terms of life-years or quality-adjusted life years, often build
upon models that incorporate data from multiple sources.  Even if the data are derived primarily
from a randomized clinical trial, extrapolations beyond the period of the trial require assumptions
about disease course beyond the period of observation.  And even if a trial is the sole source of all
data used in a CE analysis, sampling variability makes estimates of effect sizes and costs uncertain.  
Not all sources of variability are purely random.  For example, the costs of an intervention
— or of treatments for conditions it prevents — may vary from one setting to another.  Thus, for
reasons ranging from the usual stochastic nature of experimental information to (possibly non-
random) variation in costs and health effects to uncertainty in model structure and specifications,
point estimates of CE ratios should ordinarily be considered just that.  The variation in possible
values around those point estimates may be large.
For this reason, CE analyses are considered incomplete if they do not include some form of
sensitivity analysis.  Sensitivity analysis is an exercise that shows the effects of variation in
uncertain parameters on the final results of the analysis (i.e., the CE ratio).  Textbooks on CE
analysis and decision analysis discuss methods of sensitivity analysis, and most commercial
software for CE and decision analysis  implements one- or two-way sensitivity analysis.  In one-way
sensitivity analysis, one uncertain parameter is varied at a time, with the values of all other
parameters held constant.  In two-way sensitivity analysis, two parameters are varied
simultaneously. When more than two parameters are varied, the presentation of results of multi-way
sensitivity analysis can be quite challenging, and creative approaches to graphical presentation are
necessary (two-way sensitivity analysis requires three-dimensional plotting, with axes for each of
the two parameters being varied and for the CE ratio). 
The limitations of traditional sensitivity analysis are most apparent when it is important to
display the effects of uncertainty in multiple parameters simultaneously.  More powerful alternative
approaches, although they are still under development, have been gaining in popularity in part
because they are more suitable for complex models with multiple sources of uncertainty.  Most are
statistical approaches that involve calculating confidence regions around CE ratios and other
outcome variables.  Briggs and Sculpher’s 1995 survey of sensitivity analysis in economic22
evaluation noted that only one of the 121 CE analyses they reviewed had adopted a “probabilistic
sensitivity analysis” approach, whereas 42 used “one way simple sensitivity analysis” and 15 used
“multi way simple sensitivity analysis” (Briggs and Sculpher (1995)).  Methods for calculating the
range of uncertainty using a probabilistic approach range from the traditional delta method to newer
simulation and resampling techniques, such as the bootstrap, which makes it possible to limit
parametric assumptions (Mullahy and Manning (1994), O'Brien, et al. (1994), Briggs, et al. (1994),
Wakker and Klaassen (1995)).  But the computational burdens of such approaches remain
formidable, and in many cases the statistical theory is not well developed or, like the delta method,
require strict distributional assumptions.  Furthermore, the patchwork of data used to develop many
CE models limits the range of approaches that can be used to gauge the effects of uncertainty.
The welfare theoretical implications of uncertainty in the analysis are important, even if they
are indirect.  It is not unusual for the range of uncertainty to be great enough to be consistent with
different orderings of effectiveness (and costs) of the interventions under consideration.
Occasionally differences in costs among alternative interventions are known with a high degree of
certainty, but ranges of estimated effectiveness overlap substantially.  A common response to this
situation is to assume that the effectiveness of each intervention is roughly equal, and to choose the
lowest-cost alternative.  However, the apparent equivalence of effectiveness may be a consequence
either of similar true effectiveness, or of large but highly uncertain differences in effectiveness.  In
the latter case, further information might alter the ranking of alternatives.
Interpretation for medical decision making and health policy
After the CE ratios of non-dominated alternatives are calculated, there remains the task of
choosing among them.  If an intervention improves health at a cost of $80,000/QALY, should it be
adopted?  Cost-benefit analysis leads to specific recommendations because it places a monetary
value on the benefits: any intervention that produces a net benefit generates a potential Pareto
improvement. But CE analysis is often preferred precisely because it avoids monetary valuation of
health benefits.  The next section describes how it is possible to derive a “cutoff” CE ratio that leads
to the same choices as a cost-benefit criterion.  However, people who apply and use CE analyses
and wish to avoid the valuation of health benefits implicit in such efforts often use an alternative
approach based on league tables. 23
The term league table apparently originates from the tables of football team rankings
published in European nations. League tables in CE analysis also display rankings. This approach
compares the CE ratio of the intervention under study to those of other common medical
interventions.  By compiling a league table of (incremental) CE ratios of other health interventions,
usually culled from the literature, one can demonstrate how the CE ratio of the intervention under
study compares with those of the other interventions in the table.  If the CE ratio is low, the
intervention is termed a good value, while if the CE ratio is high, it is identified as a poor value
relative to other accepted interventions.  Thus the tabular comparison  helps to establish whether the
intervention should be used. 
3.  When Does CE Analysis Lead to Optimal Decisions?
The league table approach, however, has severe limitations as a guide to medical choices
(Birch and Gafni (1994)). Several problems become apparent to readers of the studies that generated
the numbers.  For example, the various studies summarized in the table may not use comparable
methodology; some of the CE ratios may be incremental, others average; assumptions underlying
the cost estimates may differ greatly.  Although league tables distinguish between interventions that
are relatively good and relatively poor values, that judgment is highly dependent upon the specific
alternatives displayed in each table.  Unless there is a reason to believe that the interventions 
appearing in the league table were chosen by a process that maximizes value, we can hardly infer
that standing in the league table establishes value in any absolute sense.  Finally, even if we could
infer whether the intervention was a relatively good or bad value, the league table approach does not
establish how much should be spent.  This observation leads us back to the question posed at the
outset:  when we apply the results of CE analysis to allocate health care, do we make optimal
decisions?  No discussion of the welfare economic foundations and welfare implications of
applications of CE analysis is meaningful without consideration of how and why CE analysis is
being used.  For whom is CE analysis being conducted, and how will its results be used in allocation
decisions? 
The answers to these questions depend upon the perspective of the analysis.  The approved
practice, under most circumstances, is to adopt a societal perspective, in which we are seeking to
make the best decision about health care allocation for a group of people.  Often, however, this
perspective is taken to mean something more specific: the analysis is intended to aid someone such24
as a social planner — perhaps the health minister of a country with national health insurance or
governmentally provided health care — who must decide which health services to provide or
reimburse.  The adoption of a societal perspective can give rise to ambiguities. For example, how
should the government payer handle heterogeneous preferences, if it recognizes them at all?
The following discussion builds upon the presentation in Garber and Phelps (1997).  In that
paper, the perspective is that of a “perfect insurer,” and CE analysis is treated as a tool to determine
which services, in what quantities, the perfect insurer should reimburse. Suppose that there is no
specific information to suggest that an individual’s risk of various health events differs from the
average for the insured population, that utility functions and other characteristics are homogeneous,
and that the insurance is actuarially fair.  Which services would the optimal policy cover?  From this
point of view, the usual marginal conditions apply, and CB criteria (i.e., measure benefits and costs
accurately and cover those services at quantities that result in maximum net benefit) lead to
expected utility maximization.  Only those services whose expected benefits equal or exceed their
expected costs, which will be included in the premium and copayments, will be covered.
The Garber-Phelps approach has two major characteristics: it uses first-order conditions to
derive cutoff or threshold CE ratios, and it determines when various rules for conducting CE
analysis allow the technique to be used to determine optimal health resource allocations.  It is
possible, for example, that ignoring certain categories of costs, such as earnings lost as a result of
early death, would mean that decision rules based on CE analysis would no longer be reliable guides
to welfare maximization, or that inappropriately including such costs would also lead to incorrect
rankings of alternative health programs.  
Garber and Phelps construct the health care allocation problem as a simple von Neumann-
Morgenstern utility maximization; essentially, they ask whether the first order conditions can be
expressed in a form that leads to a CE criterion.  That is, they ask whether it is possible to identify a
threshold CE ratio such that acceptance of all interventions whose CE ratio falls below the threshold
and rejection of those with higher CE ratios would correspond to the allocation selected by direct
utility maximization.  In the Garber-Phelps model, the threshold CE ratio for an expenditure on a
health intervention in the initial period is simply the ratio between the initial period utility and the
marginal utility of income in that period.  Fundamental to this approach is an assumption that the
effectiveness measure is at least an affine transformation of utility.  Embedded in the model is an


























The general model is based on an expected utility function in which first period utility U0 is
a function of initial income Y0 less expenditures on intervention a, whose unit price is wa, and
expenditures on intervention b, at unit price wb.  Subsequent period-specific utilities are given by the
utility functions Ui(Yi) weighted by the probability that the individual will be alive in period i, Fi:




Ui can be written as Ui = υδ
iki, where υ = U0(Y).  In this formulation, Y is constant over time, and ki
is a period-specific multiplier.  Thus the summation term has the form of QALYs, in which the
quality adjustment for period i is simply Ui; this corresponds to the common use of the term
“utilities” to describe the quality adjustments. We denote the summation term by Q.
Interventions a and b can have effects on the probabilities of survival in the future via Fi and
on the utilities via ki.  Both Fi and ki, and their dependence on a and b, can have an arbitrary time
pattern.  Obtaining the first order conditions for the maximization of utility with respect to
expenditures on a and b is straightforward (note that there can be corner solutions, since optimal
expenditures might be zero for either or both interventions).  Denote the marginal effect of
intervention a on future period-specific mortality Pi by jPi/ja  = ε
a
i, and let the marginal effect of a
on period-specific quality adjustments ki be denoted by jki/ja  = ψ
a
i.  Using the relationship between
conditional mortality and cumulative probability of survival
and differentiating expected utility with respect to intervention a, we have 

















































An analogous relationship results from maximization with respect to intervention b:
The analysis then proceeds to show how the first order conditions can be translated into CE
criteria, in which future unrelated costs of health care are either included or excluded.
First, consider obtaining the optimal cutoff CE ratio when unrelated future costs are ignored. 
Current medical costs are C = waa + wbb. Let z = db/da, the marginal rate of substitution between b
and a.  Differentiating C with respect to a and substituting z yields the relationship dC/da = wa +

















Using the first order conditions to solve for the optimal values of jQ/ja and jQ/jb implies
that, at the optimum investment in intervention a, 
According to this equation, the ratio of incremental costs to incremental QALYs from further
investment in intervention a is proportional to the reciprocal of the marginal utility of consumption
in the initial period, U
'
0.  Here, the term incremental is completely synonymous with marginal, since
the CE condition is based on a comparison of an incremental expenditure on a, rather than on a
comparison to a (discrete) alternative intervention. We can use an analogous procedure to obtain the
optimal cutoff CE ratio for intervention b, yielding the result that, at optimal investment in b, 27
C tot  waawbbP1δc1P1P2δ2c2... , (12)
Thus, when future costs are ignored, the first order conditions imply that a single optimal CE ratio
applies to all interventions.  
A similar analysis establishes the optimal CE ratio when future costs are included.  In this
case, the  numerator of the CE ratio is the marginal cost of the intervention, including future health
care costs.  The lifetime costs are 
where ci = total health expenditures in period i.  Associated with the use of an intervention are costs
of the intervention itself, induce change in expenditures for the other intervention, along with











































where E = the net present value of expected health expenditures and as before z = db/da.
By following the procedures used to obtain the optimal CE ratio when future costs are























Thus, when unrelated future costs are included, the first order conditions imply a fixed
optimal CE ratio that is the same for all interventions.  The second ratio on the right-hand side of
Eq. 15 is a constant when the future costs are unrelated, so the optimal CE ratio when future costs
are included is equal to the optimal CE ratio when the future costs are excluded, plus a constant.  28
This result follows from a number of assumptions.  A key one is the optimality of future
health care expenditures.  If the expenditures are not optimal, it will ordinarily be difficult to apply a
CE criterion, since the quality adjustment terms for future years will need to reflect differential
utility losses from varying distortions in health care consumption in future years.  In addition, this
analysis uses a strict definition of “unrelated” future expenditures: conditional on reaching a given
age, a person’s expenditures on health care do not change with an increase in the quantities of
intervention a or b consumed. Thus the goods under study cannot be close substitutes or
complements for other forms of health care (nor can there be changes in the rates of substitution
between quality-enhancing and life-prolonging health care).  The conditional independence
assumption, which is intended to be an accurate representation of the term “unrelated” that often
appears in the literature without precise definition, is strict.  Even if it can seldom be satisfied
exactly, it may be a reasonable approximation for some interventions, such as the treatment of a
young accident victim with severe blood loss whose future expected pattern of health may be
unaltered by the accident if he or she survives.  
This approach does not justify the application of a fixed threshold CE ratio when the first-
order conditions cannot be met (e.g., the quantities of a and b cannot be varied continuously) or
when the second-order conditions for a maximum cannot be met.  Garber and Phelps argue that the
quantities of most health interventions are continuously variable more often than is usually apparent. 
For example, a screening test might at first seem to be an example of an unambiguously discrete-
valued quantity; a woman either has a mammogram or she does not.  It is not possible to undergo
partial mammographic screening for breast cancer.  Yet there are several margins over which the
quantity of mammography can be varied, such as the frequency of screening.  In addition, the
definition of a “positive” test — i.e., one that will lead to further diagnostic evaluation — is often
variable (for example, one or more radiologists interpreting a mammogram could estimate the
probability that a cancer is present).  A more permissive threshold for abnormality results in more
true-positive and false-positive test results, usually leading to better health outcomes and higher
costs.  Variation along such margins can be used to achieve the first-order conditions.  As Garber
and Phelps note, application of the CE approach in general requires the marginal conditions to hold,
because otherwise the use of a fixed CE ratio to be applied across all interventions, as implied by
the comparisons in league tables, will be misleading.  When the marginal conditions do not hold,
optimal health resource allocation will not imply a fixed CE ratio across all interventions.29
Restrictions in this model reflect an interpretation of QALYs in utility terms.  More flexible
utility functions and less restrictive assumptions, such as allowing for variable income and
intertemporal reallocation of income and consumption, can change the results, as Meltzer (1997)
reported.  Extending the Garber-Phelps approach by allowing for borrowing and lending and
explicitly distinguishing between health and non-health consumption, he reported that the first-order
conditions could no longer be expressed solely in terms of a ratio between marginal costs of health
interventions and marginal outcomes.  His CE condition implied that “cost-effectiveness analysis
must include the total change in future expenditures which results from a medical intervention,
regardless of whether those expenditures are medical or non-medical . . . the cost-effectiveness ratio
can be viewed as being the sum of a component related to current cost and a component related to
future cost.”  Thus, according to Meltzer, not only “unrelated” future expenditures for health care,
but also non-medical consumption expenditures, must be incorporated whenever the intervention
under study prolongs life.  His results pose a severe challenge for the routine practice of CE
analysis, since the utility terms that the quality adjustments need to measure are even further
removed from routine measurement of QALYs than under the Garber-Phelps model.  Furthermore,
the unavailability of accurate health and non-health consumption data has deterred most researchers
from implementing any approach that incorporates the present value of non-health consumption as a
health cost.
One way to interpret the results of these papers is that the decisions based on CEA can  have
favorable welfare economic properties, but only if both the costs and outcomes are measured
properly.  The outcome measure can serve as a basis for determining the first-order conditions only
if it is a valid proxy for utility.  Common practices in quality of life measurement, however, cast into
doubt their ability to proxy overall utility.  When developers of instruments for quality of life give
respondents any information about what they should assume concerning the socioeconomic status
and other factors that might change with a health state, the instructions usually say to consider only
health-related aspects.  Although rarely are versions of this instruction complete and explicit enough
to define “health-related” precisely, their wording often implies that the respondent should ignore
financial consequences of a health condition.  A treatment that improves an aspect of utility —
including utility from consumption expenditures — that is not measured by the effectiveness
measure cannot be evaluated properly in this circumstance.  But insofar as QALYs or similar30
outcome measures are used, and are sufficiently broad to serve as a proxy for utility, it becomes
much more plausible to represent utility maximization by a CE criterion. 
Difficulties with interpreting existing QALY instruments as utility measures should not cast
doubt on the theoretical appropriateness of CE analysis.  The analysis can have stronger justification
as a tool for welfare improvement if a better instrument is used.  Furthermore, even CE analysis
based on flawed measures of utility can provide a reasonable prioritization of alternative programs
to improve health.  In many circumstances, the alternative to CE analysis is a decision making
process that devotes little attention to either the costs or health consequences of the various policy
options.  Insofar as it de-emphasizes or ignores considerations such as costs, it would be surprising
if such an alternative would consistently prove to be a better guide to improvement of social welfare
than even a flawed implementation of CE analysis. 
4. Perspective and Cost Measurement
Despite its prominence as the numerator of the CE ratio, cost typically receives less space
and research effort than effectiveness in CE analyses.  This disparity may reflect the belief that
measuring costs is relatively straightforward or that uncertainty about costs can be addressed
adequately in the sensitivity analysis.  Typically there are few direct data about the QALYs or life
expectancy attributable to the use of a particular health intervention.  Even when preference and cost
data used for CE calculations are collected as part of a randomized “clinical-economic trial,”
outcomes must be modeled, as noted previously, because the duration of the trial is too short
(typically five years or less) to measure directly the QALYs that result.  (Direct measurement of
QALYs requires following trial participants until they die.)  Cost data, on the other hand, are
considered to be relatively explicit and objective. 
Estimated costs are usually (but not always) based on prices or, in the case of hospital
services, accounting costs.  In the U.S., both accounting- and price-based costs are problematic
because both vary greatly.  The price of a prescription drug purchased at a retail outlet in New York
may differ greatly from the price charged by a hospital pharmacy in Los Angeles, which in turn
differs from the price that a managed care organization pays a drug manufacturer.  For complex
services, such as a major operation, price variation may arise from variation in the  definition of the
service (not all cardiac valve replacement operations, for example, are the same), and from variation
in the prices of factors such as nursing time, surgeon time, and hospital facilities.  Although price31
and accounting cost variation is both large and pervasive in some systems, it is not an insuperable
problem for CE analysis.  The judicious application of sensitivity analysis can mitigate problems
arising from both variation and uncertainty in costs.  Furthermore, in most applications, the
uncertainty is greatest for costs incurred in the distant future.  Such cost estimates require
speculation about future health care practices and disease patterns, and thus compound uncertainty
about the costs per unit of service.  Discounting future costs at an interest rate of 3% or higher,
however, means that different methods for measuring costs incurred in the distant future often
produce similar present values.  Consequently, many CE studies focus on estimation of
effectiveness, which often requires indirect inference from results of disparate studies and the use of
complex models.
Measurement of costs may nevertheless pose fundamental questions.  The most basic is,
what is the appropriate measure of cost for use in CE analysis?  Should it be marginal cost,  average
cost, or neither?  Many of the leading references on CE analysis say little about specific cost
measures.  For example, the aforementioned article by Weinstein and Stason (1977) enumerated
categories of costs to include in direct medical and health care costs.  But the article did not specify
whether “costs” are prices in the service market, marginal costs of production, or average costs.  In
the presence of market imperfections — especially when fixed costs are significant — these
alternative measures of cost can differ greatly. In a more detailed discussion of costs, the first
edition of the textbook by Drummond, et al. (1987) stated that the costs should be “an estimate of
the worth of the resources depleted by the programme” (p. 27) and subsequently discussed the
various categories of costs (marginal, variable, average, and fixed costs), noting the reasons why
different cost measures might be used.  Their discussion suggests that the difference in total costs
between two alternatives should be used as the measure of costs.  Their discussion of how capital
costs can be measured, however, stops short of recommending a specific measure to use if fixed or
capital costs are large.  
The treatment of fixed costs is only one of several controversies surrounding the
measurement of costs in both CE and cost-benefit analysis.  Experts debate whether only direct
costs of the alternatives and of subsequent health care should be included, or whether  productivity
(indirect) costs (lost earnings or lost value of time) should also be included.  They also debate how
direct costs should be measured.  What if, as is usual in health care, prices do not equal marginal
costs?  What is the appropriate measure of opportunity cost when markets are imperfect? 32
Should the societal perspective be the default?
Although there are not ready answers to all of these questions, they can be best addressed in
the context of a specific perspective. Textbooks and review articles routinely emphasize the
importance of selecting the perspective of the analysis (U.S. Congress Office of Technology
Assessment (1980), Weinstein and Stason (1977)).  Perspective determines whose costs are
counted; the perspective of the patient, for example, is usually held to mean that only the costs that
the patient bears directly — not the payments of an insurer or government program — matter.  Since
a typical American with indemnity health insurance bears 20% or less of the price of a covered
health service, and in other health care systems the patient’s share of costs is often negligible, an
intervention that looks very cost-effective when only the patient’s out-of-pocket costs are considered
may seem like a poor value when the cost measure reflects total costs to the health care system. 
Opportunity costs, therefore, must be defined with reference to the perspective of the analysis.
The standard recommendation to conduct CE analysis from the societal perspective means
that all costs, whether born by patients, insurers, or other parties, are included.  Other perspectives
may also be considered, but they are options to be contrasted with the societal perspective, not
replacements for it.  As in other perspectives, there should not be double-counting of costs (which in
turn implies that pure, frictionless transfer payments are not counted as costs), nor in the societal
perspective should any relevant costs be omitted.  Consider an operation that costs $10,000, for
which the insurer pays $8,000 and the patient pays a $2,000 copayment.  A CE analysis conducted
from the perspective of the patient would assign only a $2,000 cost to the intervention, one
conducted from the insurer’s perspective would assign $8,000, and one conducted from a societal
perspective would assign the full cost of $10,000.
Critics of recommendations to make the societal perspective the default or principal
perspective for CE analyses often note that analyses are conducted for a variety of reasons.
Consumers and producers of CE analyses can be payers, pharmaceutical companies, providers, and
purchasers of health care, so their cost perspectives may be relevant in many important and common
situations.  These criticisms of the use of the societal perspective are based on an assumption that a
payer or government agency, for example, can ignore costs that it does not bear.  Yet this
assumption is not always realistic.  Consider a private insurer; the “payer’s perspective,” as usually
conceived, includes reimbursements that the insurer pays but not the out-of-pocket payments of its33
subscribers.  If an insurer does not care about the well-being of its subscribers, so that it can ignore
the costs the subscriber bears, then why does it care about maximizing each subscriber’s QALYs,
which are usually far more difficult to measure?  If an insurer sells policies in a competitive market,
the value of the policy will depend in part upon the out-of-pocket expenses and time costs that the
patient bears.  The belief that the insurer ignores costs to the patient overlooks an important fact:
insurance programs that account for out-of-pocket expenses and time costs as well as payments by
the insurer offer greater benefit to subscribers than do those that ignore such costs.  In the face of
informational limitations and other forms of market failure, a private insurer may not provide
optimal levels and types of insurance coverage, but one that ignores costs borne by the subscriber is
unlikely to survive long in the marketplace.
Government programs can also act as payers or as providers (as does Great Britain’s
National Health Service); the same consideration applies to them.  Some government functionaries
may consider only the costs that their agencies or programs bear.  Implicit in such a strict
government perspective is an assumption that the health benefits the agency provides are relevant,
but monetary benefits and costs, unless directly borne by the agency, are not.  Such a point of view,
even if widely held by government officials, is at odds with the overt aim of such programs:  to
serve citizens.  The beneficiaries of such programs care about the costs that they bear themselves, in
addition to the health improvements that result from the services that  they receive.  Officials who
hold a narrow governmental perspective might recommend extensive centralization of clinical
services so that, for example, a diabetic might need to travel for several hours for a routine office
visit.  Surely the inconvenience and cost to the patient, if regularly ignored, would have
repercussions for the official, the agency, and the government.  The consequences might not be
equally severe or immediate in every society or political system.  Nevertheless, government agencies
must be concerned about their budgets and the costs and benefits to the populations that they serve. 
Thus the societal perspective is informative even for payers, government agencies, and other entities
that would seem to have an interest in a more limited range of costs.
The challenge of fixed costs
Implementation of the societal perspective can be difficult, especially when the production
of a health intervention requires high fixed costs.  The societal perspective usually implies that
health services should be used to the point where marginal costs equal the value of the marginal34
gain in health outcomes.  But in the presence of significant fixed costs, price deviates substantially
from marginal cost.  Large investments for research and development are necessary before many
drugs and medical devices can be marketed. Marginal costs of production fail to account for the
substantial development investments that are characteristic of pharmaceuticals. Typical
recommendations to use marginal costs in CE analysis differ strikingly from typical practice, which
uses some measure of the sales price of medications.  Price is often many multiples of the marginal
cost of producing a drug, at least while the drug is still under patent protection.  Many of the same
issues arise in joint production and in other situations in which costing is ambiguous.
For the most part, the CE literature gives little guidance on this subject.  There is widespread
understanding that neither charges nor actual payments for health care are necessarily equal to costs
of production, at least as defined in conventional economic terms (Finkler (1982)).  The Panel on
Cost-Effectiveness in Cost and Medicine, noting that cost should represent an opportunity cost,
went well beyond most of the published CE literature in discussing in comprehensive terms what
the alternative measures of cost are, and what measures are theoretically justifiable.  The Panel
generally urged that long-term marginal costs should be used as the basis for costs, but the specific
recommendation depended on the question being asked.  They recommended that “fixed costs . . .
should be excluded . . . costs should not be included for inputs or outputs that are unaffected by
changes in the intensity or frequency of an intervention.” The panel then made the observation that
in the long run there are few fixed costs.
In a discussion of R&D and “first-copy”costs, the report reiterated the recommendation,
stating “if the technology has already been developed and the decision addresses the use of the
intervention, such as dosage of a drug or frequency of a screening test, then the price should exclude
R&D costs. Instead, the relevant costs are the incremental production, distribution, and provision
costs.” Thus, it suggested that the first-copy or fixed R&D costs should be ignored, implying that
the CE analysis should use the marginal cost of the intervention even if the price paid (as for a drug)
would often be substantially higher. 
This approach might correspond to the outcome that we would seek from a cost-benefit
analysis in which we attempted to maximize welfare by adding consumer and producer surplus. 
The usual teaching (that is, abstracting from the difficult problem of determining how to pay the
fixed costs) is that the socially optimal level of consumption would be the point at which the
marginal benefits equal the marginal costs (see Figure 4), which might be low for a drug.35
Figure 4.  Monopolistic pricing and competitive quantities.  The classic monopolist chooses the
quantity to set marginal revenue to marginal cost, indicated by Qm, and adopts the price
corresponding to that quantity on the demand curve, Pm.  Presumably implementation of a CE
criterion with quantity set according to marginal cost pricing would result in the competitive
quantity Qc, but the price would be Pm rather than Pc.  Monopoly revenues would therefore be Pm*Qc
rather than Pm * Qm.  If the purchasers are not price-takers the market behavior might correspond
more closely to bilateral monopoly, so that the price paid might be less than Pm.
In a static partial equilibrium analysis that level of consumption would be Pareto optimal,
and the effects of changes in price would be purely distributional.  As Figure 4 shows, the revenues
to a monopolist under an allocation that used marginal costs for the CE criterion but required
payment of monopoly prices would lead to larger revenues for the producer than under the
conditions of monopolistic supply and competitive demand (price-taking purchasers).36
Despite the seeming clarity of their recommendation for excluding fixed costs, the Panel’s
discussion does not provide unambiguous guidance when fixed costs are substantial.  The Panel
seemed uncomfortable mandating that only this perspective on costs would be appropriate. 
Although the Panel did not state this explicitly, if a government agency or insurer announced that it
would make 
coverage or provision decisions based on decision rules that ignored fixed or first-copy costs, they
would directly influence research and development decisions for future products and services by
assuring high rewards to innovation.  In other words, although fixed and first-copy costs for existing
technologies have already been borne, investments in fixed costs are endogenous and dependent
upon expected revenues, which in turn depend upon the rule for handling such costs in CE analysis. 
Recognizing that the authors and readers of CE analysis are rarely concerned with producer’s
surplus and rents, the Panel’s report leaves room for other perspectives: 
. . . For perspectives other than societal, the price paid by the decision maker for the good or
service is the relevant one, inclusive of whatever return on investment in R&D or rent to
patent- or copyright-holder has been incorporated in to the price.  If a patient or insurance
carrier pays a price for zidovudine (AZT) that reflects patent restrictions, for example, the
relevant price for a CEA is the one paid, not the opportunity cost of the inputs that went into
producing the actual units of AZT consumed . . .
Since the Panel generally endorsed the societal perspective, what justification can there be for this
more limited perspective?  Is this perspective appropriate when there are high fixed or first-copy
costs?
This more limited perspective is used in most CE analyses of drugs, suggesting that few
analysts consider the full societal perspective to be the appropriate one in this context.  Few
purchasers of health care would be interested in an analysis that evaluated CE of an intervention by
assuming a cost much lower than the price at which they could obtain it.  That may be why the
Panel gave such explicit, and favorable, attention to a perspective that was not societal in the
context of high fixed costs.  But is the usual practice excessively narrow, ignoring benefits to the
producers of interventions?
There is little question about the importance of this issue.  New drugs and medical devices
are almost always produced by monopolists (albeit sometimes competing with close substitutes), so
the disparity between price and marginal cost is large.  According to a comprehensive report on
pharmaceutical R&D published by the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment in 1993, in1As part of a study for the Office of Technology Assessment, my colleagues and I
attempted to determine the R&D costs and production costs for a very expensive drug
(alglucerase) used to treat Gaucher disease, an uncommon genetic disorder. Although we were
able to discuss the costs and view internal accounting documents from the company, it was very
difficult to ascertain the manufacturing costs and the R&D costs.  Production of alglucerase,
which was made by chemical modification of an enzyme found in human placentas, was
unusually expensive, but nevertheless we estimated that the price of the drug was about twice the
marginal cost.  The R&D costs born by the company were relatively small, since the drug was
discovered by federal scientists and licensed to the company; see Garber, et al. (1992).
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the U.S. the cost of bringing to market a drug whose R&D was initiated between 1970 and 1982 was
about $194 million (U.S. Congress Office of Technology Assessment (1993)).  This figure is open
to debate, and industry sources claim the cost is $250 million or more. Nevertheless, there is no
doubt that profits require charging more than marginal cost.  Marginal costs — in particular, the
costs of manufacturing additional units of a drug — are proprietary information, and are generally
unknown.
1  However, because the original producer of a drug is usually believed to have the lowest
manufacturing costs (since it is a large-scale producer), the prices of generic compounds after patent
expiration give upper limits on the marginal costs, and these prices are often small fractions of the
prices charged during the period of patent protection.  Thus, the disparity between price and
marginal cost is likely to be large for most drugs that are under patent protection.  Although the
same may be true of devices, they have been studied less and production costs may account for a
larger share of their average costs.
By recognizing what CE analysis can do best, we can begin to reconcile the contradiction
between the usual practice and the usual recommendation of adopting a societal perspective, i.e.,
one that includes all costs and ignores fixed costs.  The technique is not particularly useful for
determining the full social optimum, particularly in a dynamic context with large fixed costs, and it
is rarely used for that purpose.  Instead, the relevant perspective in most cases is that of consumers
and their agents.
The perspective is essentially that of a perfect insurer, as defined in the Garber and Phelps
paper.   Mark Pauly has argued that a similar perspective, that of a managed care organization, is
often the best one to use in thinking about health care allocation decisions (Pauly (1995)).  This
perspective differs from a full societal perspective by ignoring producer surplus. Because the
producer surplus is a real component of welfare, government or society should not ignore it.  But the
practical challenges that must be overcome to maximize the combined surplus by using CE analysis38
are considerable.  For example, if “society” is a province of Canada and the intervention in question
is a drug produced by an American company with investors from around the world, Canadians who
give greater weight to benefits that accrue to other Canadians will not weigh the company’s profits
as highly.  If the drug or other intervention cannot be obtained at marginal cost, and if health
budgets are constrained, can there be any assurance that the attempted application of a CE criterion
based on marginal cost will lead to an optimal distribution?  A health plan or program that strictly
applies the marginal cost concept will treat the costs of two drugs as if they are equal, if the
marginal costs of production are similar, even if the price of one is ten times as great as the price of
the other.
The attempt to invoke a full societal perspective raises both theoretical and practical
difficulties.  For example, if buyers purchase pharmaceuticals to the point at which marginal cost
and marginal benefits are equal, but pay a monopoly price, monopoly profits should be substantially
greater than under the conventional monopoly equilibrium (at which marginal revenue equals
marginal cost; see Figure 4). Although the resulting allocation might be Pareto-optimal in a static
world, it creates incentives that might cause distortions in investment decisions.  The extraordinary
profits would induce overinvestment in the development of new pharmaceuticals.  Furthermore, as
the preceding discussion noted, marginal costs (particularly for drugs still under patent) are usually
unknowable, since they constitute proprietary information. 
The approach that uses a full societal perspective, with marginal costs as the measure of the
costs, implies the need for a nonmarket method of financing.  Application of the CE threshold
implies that the quantity of a drug purchased will be larger if the CE cost assigned to the
intervention is marginal cost rather than the purchase price.  To estimate the full optimum, the
analyst would have to take into account distortions induced by the method of financing, such as
deadweight losses due to income taxation for financing government health care programs.  The
behavioral change induced by tax incentives can be large, so that the cost of obtaining funds via
taxation can greatly exceed the money raised.  It is likely that the distortions induced by the modes
of financing private health insurance are also large.  The distortions introduced by the method of
financing present a problem for any attempt to use a CE (or cost-benefit) framework to determine a
full social optimum.  The marginal cost criterion, with the implied increase in quantity consumed,
will exacerbate the problem.39
Distributional considerations
Distributional concerns about CE analysis are raised frequently; such concerns are also
prominent in the most vociferous objections to application of CB analysis.  Nearly every public
program for health care is intended to mitigate inequalities in health, in part by ensuring that the
poor have access to effective care.  Thus, many discussions of the desirability of CE allocations
consider distributional consequences.  A strong emphasis on the magnitude of producer’s surplus
would be incongruous for those nations and groups with deep beliefs about the importance of
distributive justice, especially insofar as the owners of companies that produce pharmaceuticals and
other health care products are drawn from the upper ranks of the distribution of income and wealth.
Summary: costs and perspective
Fundamentally, the major issue in defining costs for CE analysis revolves around the
definition of opportunity cost.  Ordinarily, prices are reasonable proxies for costs.  But numerous
market imperfections imply that prices are not always good proxies for marginal costs of health
care.  Because the value of the cost estimate has implications for the adoption and scale of
utilization of health interventions when CE analysis is used to aid decision making, these are not
merely technical issues.  In real-world situations in which the method is likely to be used, the
attempt to implement a societal optimum by using nebulous marginal cost figures and purchasing
goods and services as if the cost equaled the marginal cost may be unhelpful.  Many of the
controversies about costs disappear, or at least the problems are mitigated, when analysts present the
form of consumer perspective suggested here, in which the premium and out-of-pocket costs of
consumers purchasing idealized insurance are the basis for direct cost measurement.  Producer
benefits also matter, but CE analysis does not offer a comprehensive framework for evaluating
them, particularly in a dynamic context.  Thus, this perspective is both meaningful and
understandable, and is the appropriate perspective for many government agencies, private payers,
and providers making decisions about health care. 
5.  Measuring Outcomes
According to the preceding discussion, the welfare economic foundations of CE analysis rest
upon the validity of the outcome measure as a representation of utility. This aim was not explicit in40
the initial development of outcome measures for CE analyses in health care.  Whether the purpose
of the CE analysis is to maximize utility or to maximize a global measure of health-related quality
of life, however, its credibility depends heavily on the comprehensiveness and relevance of the
health outcome measure.  A highly specific outcome or effectiveness measure like the yield of
abnormal test results or the magnitude of the blood pressure response to an antihypertensive drug
may be understandable,  persuasive, and sensitive to the effects of the intervention under study.  But
such a measure cannot be used to compare a diverse set of health interventions to be administered to
patients with different health conditions.  Furthermore, despite occasional claims and implicit
assumptions to the contrary, only rarely will such a measure capture all the potential benefits and
harms of an intervention.  Thus, a comprehensive and general measure of health outcomes is of
fundamental importance, whether the analysis is to be justified by appeal to welfare economics or by
simple appeal to the inherent plausibility of the health measure.
It is for these reasons that QALYs are most frequently recommended as the outcome
measure for CE analysis.  More general alternatives, like healthy-year equivalents (HYEs) have
attractive theoretical properties (Gafni and Birch (1997), Mehrez and Gafni (1989), Mehrez and
Gafni (1993)) but have not gained widespread acceptance, probably because they are perceived as
difficult to implement (Johannesson, et al. (1993), Gold, et al. (1996)).  The following brief
discussion emphasizes measurement of the preference weights qi that appear in Eq. 3.
Steps to measuring QALYs
Three components are needed to calculate an individual’s utility at a point in time.  First is
the definition of the health state in question, which might be a particular disease with specific
symptom severity; second is the utility attached to that health state, and third is the probability that
the individual will be in that health state.  By summing the products of the utilities of each possible
health state and their probabilities, it is possible to obtain the expected utility (or QALY
contribution) corresponding to the time period in question.  This formulation has the advantage of
breaking the task of calculating QALYs into manageable components: description of the health
state; assessment of utilities toward the health state; and estimating the probability of the health
state.
Defining and describing the health state are fundamental to modeling effectiveness.  The CE
analysis must include each state of health that the intervention might affect, either by preventing or41
treating illness, or by causing side-effects.  Thus, if the intervention under study is surgery for the
treatment of coronary artery disease, important health states to model include the presence and
severity of angina pectoris, heart attacks, and other symptoms of heart disease or complications of
the procedure (or, for that matter, of any alternatives to which it is compared).  The scope of
available data and analytical tractability limit the number of health states that can be modeled. 
Many analyses use Markov modeling and related techniques to describe the progression over time of
the probabilities of various health states, and if too many health states are included, there may be
few or no transitions between infrequently occurring health states, precluding reliable estimation of
some of the parameters of the model.
Dolan’s chapter discusses how preference assessment is performed to estimate the utilities or
quality weights specific to each health state. A critical issue for preference assessment is whether the
respondent — the person whose preferences are being assessed — is asked to place a value on his
own current or recent state of health, or is instead asked to place a value on a hypothetical state of
health.  For example, the preference questions could be directed toward people known to have a
particular health state, such as moderately symptomatic coronary artery disease, and they could be
asked how their current state of health compares to an ideal state of health.  The alternative is to
provide a description of a hypothetical state of health and to ask respondents to imagine themselves
in that health state and to rate it.
There are several difficulties with rating one’s own health state.  First, the preferences of
people experiencing a state of (usually chronic) ill health may differ systematically from the
preferences of the general population.  In the face of a disparity, there is no strict consensus about
whose preferences should be used.   The Panel on Cost-Effectiveness in Health and Medicine
argued that when societal (i.e. governmental) resources are used to pay for health care, the
preferences should be those of the general population rather than those of individuals with a health
condition (Gold, et al. (1996)).  Furthermore, it is difficult to study large samples of individuals who
have a specific health condition, especially if the condition is uncommon.  It is also possible that the
disutility associated with a health state may reflect co-existing health conditions or risk factors that
predispose to the disease rather than the disease itself.  For example, high blood pressure is an
asymptomatic condition that increases the risk of heart disease and stroke.  People with high blood
pressure rate their own health as relatively poor, even when they have not suffered any
complications.  Because treatment lowers the blood pressure but does not remedy associated health42
conditions, it does not improve quality of life as greatly as would be predicted from a model in
which preferences are obtained from people with the disease and treatment is assumed to restore
them to perfect health.
The validity of the alternative approach, rating hypothetical health states, is highly
dependent on the accuracy and completeness of the description of the hypothetical state(s).  The
health state description is not critical for a state of health that most respondents have experienced,
such as the symptoms of a viral upper respiratory infection or mild low back pain.  But for a health
state that few respondents have experienced themselves or vicariously through a relative or friend,
nearly all the information that the respondent can bring to bear on the question must be provided in
the description.  This requirement can be an advantage, since it is easier to control the impression
that naive respondents have of the health state than the impressions of experienced respondents. 
But it also means that small and seemingly inconsequential changes in the presentation of the health
state can greatly influence the utilities assigned to it.  To enhance the reproducibility and validity of
ratings of hypothetical states, it is essential to pay close attention to the wording and general design
of such elicitations.
Estimating survival and probabilities of health states
Even for interventions that do not alter the length of life, it is usually necessary to describe
patterns of survival since these patterns determine the changes in QALYs that result from use of the
interventions.  Many treatments, of course, are designed to prevent death, so estimation of survival
effects, or the survival probabilities in Eqs. 2 and 3, is a key component of most CE analyses.
Approaches to measuring survival probabilities vary greatly.  Survival estimates nearly
always require an element of modeling, since experimental data (from a randomized trial) are
usually limited to brief (less than five years) follow-up periods.  To estimate the effect on life
expectancy, it is necessary to combine such data with observational data about longer-term
outcomes in typical practice settings.
The techniques for estimating the pattern of survival associated with an intervention vary. 
One study of a treatment for heart attacks shows how clinical trial and observational data can be
combined to estimate long-term outcomes.   Researchers from the GUSTO trial, a study of tissue-
type plasminogen activator (t-PA), a drug used to dissolve the blood clots that can cause
obstructions in the coronary arteries and precipitate heart attacks, sought to determine the long-term43
survival benefit by supplementing direct clinical trial data, obtained during an average of 12 months
of follow-up, with a model of survival based on an observational database (the Duke Cardiovascular
Registry), and a parametric survival function for extrapolating beyond the 14 years of data
represented in the observational database.  Figure 5 displays the resulting survival curve.  Published
CE analyses have used a variety of other methods.  Some analyses used life table data for either the
general population or, where available, for patients who have a specific health condition, and
applied a relative risk reduction as estimated in a clinical trial, imposing the assumption that the
relative risk reduction is constant across different populations and ages.
By generalizing the methods for estimating survival, one can also estimate probabilities that
various states of health will occur in the future, under either the treatment or the intervention. 
Usually Markov-like modeling offers the most convenient approach to estimating future
probabilities of health states.  One such approach estimates first the probability that an individual
receiving the intervention is alive, say, two years in the future, then uses data from clinical trials or
other sources to estimate the probability that, if alive, the patient will be in a symptomatic state of
ill-health, and the probability that he or she will be in excellent health.  Typically availability of data
on rates of adverse events (such as onset or progression of disease, death rates, and morbidity),
rather than technical issues (such as the formal structure of the model to depict disease
advancement), limits the estimation of probabilities of health states.
Preference assessment
The remaining step in calculating QALYs is to assign utilities, or preference weights, to each
of the health states.  Several reviews describe and compare alternative methods for preference
assessment, and Dolan (1999) discusses the topic extensively in this volume.  Dolan reviews a wide
range of issues in assessing preferences and in their interpretation from the point of view of QALY
calculation.  As his discussion of the methodological issues in assigning utilities to health states
implies, preference assessment is sometimes a source of considerable uncertainty in CE analyses. 
The most reproducible methods of preference assessment, such as the visual analog scale, are not
derived from von Neumann-Morgenstern utility theory.  Methods that are more firmly grounded in
utility theory, such as the standard gamble, are neither perfectly general nor easy for respondents to
understand.  44
Figure 5.  Probability of survival among patients treated with t-PA. A survival function of this type was
used to estimate life expectancy for each treatment group. The curve consists of three parts: the survival
pattern in the first year after treatment in the GUSTO study, data for an additional 14 years on survivors of
myocardial infarction in the Duke Cardiovascular Disease Database, and a Gompertz parametric survival
function adjusted to agree with the empirical survival data at the 10-year and 15-year follow-up points. 
Source: Mark, et al. (1995).  Reproduced by permission. Copyright © 1995 Massachusetts Medical
Society.  All rights reserved.
Since the validity of CE analysis as a guide to welfare maximization rests upon the validity
of QALYs as a measure of utility, the conditions that preference assessment needs to meet are
stringent.  Usually discussions of quality of life for use in CE analysis emphasize that the
measurement should be of health-related quality of life.  Well known preference-weighted health
status indices used to attach utilities to health states — such as the Health Utilities Index of
Torrance and colleagues, the Quality of Well-Being scale developed by Kaplan and colleagues, and
the Rosser scale — omit mention of non-health consumption and financial status (for an extended
discussion of these and other scales, see45
 the book by Patrick and Erickson (1993)).  According to some experts, respondents should be asked
to ignore effects of states of ill health on income and other financial repercussions.  Yet the
plausibility of QALYs as measures of utility depends on the ability to represent fully the changes in
well-being that occur with the adoption of an intervention, and often these changes will not be
limited to those that are primarily health related.  Such concerns may be of little importance if the
only financial consequence is loss of earned income, which ordinarily would be incorporated into
the numerator of the CE ratio. But if a health state causes alteration of non-health consumption,
which is not reflected in the preference assessment procedure (e.g., development of severe arthritis
may necessitate changes in clothing, furniture, and use of various non-health services), the adverse
effects of the health state will be underestimated.
Preference heterogeneity and its consequences for CE analysis
Perhaps the greatest practical challenge to the use of QALYs to represent utilities is the
variation in preferences that is all but certain to occur in the context of specific health limitations.
Just as demand for any good or service varies, so do preferences for states of health.  A well-known
study of treatment of benign prostatic hyperplasia, which causes a variety of urinary symptoms,
demonstrated that variation in attitudes toward specific health limitations can dramatically alter the
value of treatment.  The most common surgical treatment of prostatic disease is transurethral
resection of the prostate, an operation that can be highly effective at relieving the excessive urinary
frequency and nocturia (awakening at night to void) and other symptoms that men with prostatic
obstruction experience.   The operation, however, can cause incontinence, impotence, and other
side-effects, some of them permanent. Men who are candidates for surgery vary greatly in their
relative preferences for the symptoms of prostatic hyperplasia and the side-effects of the operation,
so that the expected quality of life is greater with surgery for some and with nonsurgical
management for others (Barry, et al. (1988), Fowler, et al. (1988)).
Without even considering costs, then, the “best” treatment varies when preferences vary. 
When CE is used as a criterion for determining the allocation of interventions, preference variation
often poses more significant problems.  It is possible that every patient who is a candidate for
treatment with a particular intervention will gain QALYs from it.  But the intervention is much
more cost-effective in those patients who experience the greatest disutility from the disease being46
treated, and who lose little utility from the side-effects of treatment.  Other patients who have
identical health characteristics may experience little disutility from the disease and more from the
treatment.  It is very hard for any health care delivery or financing system to distinguish these two
types of patients, both of whom would desire the intervention.  Although individual clinical
decisions can take such heterogeneity into account, even in the physician’s office the necessary
information, and the ability to use it, may be limited.
QALY measurement and the application of CE analysis
Technical issues in QALY measurement raise questions about the reliability and validity of
QALYs, as usually calculated, as measures of utility.  One message from the literature that uses
weights based on preferences rather than statistical weights or simple sums to measure quality of life
is that comprehensive measures of utility are difficult for study subjects to understand.  The
reproducibility of such measures, particularly when the underlying preference assessment technique
is as complicated as the standard gamble, is often disappointing.  The limitations of such measures
are partly responsible for the popularity of quality of life measures that are not preference weighted
(such as the Rand Corporation’s SF-36 scale) or that are not even global measures of quality of life
(such as disease-specific quality of life scales).  Although these alternative measures offer apparent
practical advantages, rarely can they be considered reasonable proxy measures of utility.  The major
conceptual problem with the preference assessment measures as usually applied is that they do not
allow the state of being to be construed broadly enough, a problem that is far worse for disease-
specific measures.  Measures that are not preference weighted lack the interval scaling properties
required for the tradeoff between length and quality of life implicit in QALYs.
The practical problems are particularly great when the benefit from a health intervention is
small.  Consider, for example, a medicated lotion that relieves the itch of a rash that appears on the
arms and back.  Even if the lotion completely relieves the rash as soon as it is applied, it will be
extremely difficult to assess utilities for the relief of the rash using standard preference assessment
techniques.  All of the techniques require a tradeoff between a risk of death and symptom relief, but
if the symptoms are mild or their duration is brief enough, it is difficult for respondents to estimate
the risk of death (or for the time-tradeoff method, the reduction in the length of life) that they would
tolerate for an improvement in the symptoms.  For this intervention and others that produce small or
brief improvements in quality of life, the willingness-to-pay approach used in CB analysis would
likely offer a much more suitable approach to valuation.47
An ideal measure of health outcomes would be less restrictive than QALYs, abandoning the
additive separability embedded in the functional form and the (usually) constant rate of time
preference, but preference assessment instruments capable of supporting more general models
would impose upon respondents even greater cognitive burdens than current methods.  Research on
these methods remains active, in some cases reflecting the great interest of governments in applying
CE analysis to health care decisions more extensively.  As utility measurement improves, claims
that the results of CE analysis can be applied to maximize social welfare can be made with greater
confidence.  Furthermore, although the QALY is not perfectly general as a measure of well-being, it
is likely to be a close approximation to more general measures and to represent an acceptable
tradeoff between conceptual validity and feasibility.  Unlike many competing measures of quality of
life, such as the statistically-weighted quality of life indices, QALYs are conceptually appropriate
and have the potential to approach the theoretical ideal when preference assessment techniques are
developed further.
6.  Recommendations
A fundamental but often unstated characteristic of any CE analysis is its purpose.  Is that
purpose to enable an insurer, a health plan, or a government agency to decide whether to cover a
specific intervention? Is it to help a consumer decide which form of treatment to receive?  Is it to
help a manager make decisions about large investments in health care infrastructure?  Is it to help a
formulary committee choose which of several drugs should be available in a hospital pharmacy?  Or
is it to help a decision maker determine the allocation of health care that will achieve a suitably
defined social optimum, regardless of who that decision maker is?
Most experts in CE analysis argue that, unless there are compelling reasons to do otherwise,
CE analyses should be conducted from the societal perspective.  Under this perspective, all costs
and all benefits are relevant, but usually analysts assume that the health benefits accrue entirely to
the individual receiving care.  Exceptions are sometimes made in other circumstances, such as when
there are significant externalities.  For example, family members may provide care or other people
may bear a cost when an individual is injured or ill.  Even in the absence of externalities, though, an
attempt to use CE analysis to determine a full societal optimum, while laudable, in important
circumstances may stretch the technique to the breaking point.  Even for a circumscribed measure of
optimality like the Kaldor-Hicks criterion (i.e, potential Pareto improvement), such determinations48
may be difficult for products characterized by economies of scale and by other failures of the
assumptions of perfectly competitive markets.  How and whether to include the preference of
producers in a CE analysis are certain to be controversial, particularly when the profits accrue in a
population markedly different from the one that is being treated.  Profits are certainly a component
of overall welfare, and to remove them from the CE analysis is not the same as saying that they are
unimportant.  CE analysis does not provide a comprehensive framework for including them.
As common practice dictates, and the abilities of the technique mandate, most CE analyses
should be conducted from a consumer-oriented perspective, but not from the one that is generally
described as the consumer’s or patient’s perspective.  Rather, the most robust perspective is that of
an insurer acting as a perfect agent for its enrollees.  Specifically, it assumes that the members of the
defined population are behind a “veil of ignorance,” having no particular information to distinguish
their risk of developing any disease or health condition or desire to utilize services from the average
for the defined population.  The insurer charges an actuarially fair premium, and has no costs other
than the payment of benefits.  There are no informational failures of consequence, other than
symmetric uncertainty, in the sense that neither the insurer nor any individual has more or less
information than others.  
Perhaps the most difficult challenge for the implementation of CE analysis is the technique’s
application in heterogeneous populations.  The optimality properties of the CE approach are based
upon the application of an individual’s specific CE ratio cutoff to decisions about care.  For that
individual, any intervention whose CE ratio is below the cutoff is welfare-enhancing (i.e., passes a
CB criterion), whereas any with a greater CE ratio does not.  But for many reasons — income, risk
preferences, and various other attitudes and values — CE cutoffs vary greatly across individuals. 
Many, if not most, CE analyses are used to inform decisions made at a group level yet implicitly
apply a single cutoff.  Decisions based on a single cutoff cannot claim to have the same optimality
properties in a heterogeneous population.  The cutoff will be greater than the actual cutoff for some
people, and less than the actual cutoff for others.  Furthermore, the optimal single cutoff for a
heterogeneous population would not necessarily correspond to the average valuation.
The preceding discussion suggests that the welfare implications of the application of CE
analysis are clearest when strong conditions are met.  The research challenges include better
measurement – for example of health outcomes, preferences, and costs – and further investigation
into the implications of using CE analysis when ideal conditions do not apply.  The measurement of49
preferences is an area of ongoing research, and it would be helpful to compare the results of
analyses that use QALYs with those that use either simpler measures of health outcomes (e.g., life
expectancy) or more comprehensive measures (e.g., healthy year equivalents).  Further investigation
of the theoretical issues would help to clarify the meaning and generalizability of the results of CE
analyses.  For example, what are the welfare implications of prioritization based on CE ratios when
some health services are subsidized but a number of substitutes for them are not?  What are the
implications of inter-individual variation in rates of time preference?  What are the welfare gains
from using individual rather than uniform CE cutoffs in heterogeneous populations?   Under what
circumstances are simple CE analyses accurate guides to welfare maximization?
CE analysis can be a useful aid to decision making in health care.  In specific circumstances
it can be quite powerful.  Yet its grounding in welfare economics has often been implicit, and an
explicit examination of how one can use a CE criterion to achieve a potential Pareto improvement
demonstrates that the necessary conditions are exacting. Nevertheless, of widely accepted, existing
methods for incorporating economic considerations in the prioritization and allocation of health
care, CE analysis is probably the most rigorous.  Exploration of its welfare economic foundations
has the additional advantage of helping to resolve ambiguities in matters such as the measurement
of costs, and can help to inform the development of new instruments for measuring quality-of-life
effects.  CE analysis is not a perfect tool, but in many situations, it may be good enough.5051
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